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KISTLER V. V ASl
[71 C.2d 281; 78 Cal.Rptr. 170,455 P.2d 106]

[L. A. No. 29626.

In Bank.
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June 18, 1969.]

ART C. KISTLER et aI., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v.
ANTHONY D. V ASI et aI., Defendants and Respondents.

I

[1] Trust Deeds-Sale Under Power-Deficiency-Application of
Statutes.-Recovery of the balance due on a promissory note
secured by a second deed of trust on real property, the security
having been exhausted by a sale under the first deed of trust,
was not barred by the antideficiency provisions of Code Civ.
Proc., § 580b, where the note was accepted by plaintiff real
estate brokers in lieu of cash payment of the commission due
from one of the parties to a real estate exchange, where defendants, by giving such note, in effect borrowed from plaintiffs
a part of the cash difference they owed in connection with
the exchange, thereby reducing their obligation to the other
parties to the exchange, where the property involved was
unimproved commercial property, and where, under the plain
language of the statute, plaintiffs were lenders, not vendors.

[2] Id.-Sale Under Power-Deficiency-Applica.tion of Statutes.
-The 1963 amendment to Code Civ. Proc., § 580b, expressly
distinguishes between lenders of purchase money and vendors
and contemplates that the parties to a sale of real property,
other than residential property as defined in the statute, may
freely elect to arrange for the financing of the purchase price
in ways that may wholly or in part limit the vendees's protection from deficiency judgments.

.APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange
County. Herbert S. Herlands, Judge. Reversed.
Action to recover the balance due on a promissory note.
Summary judgment for defendant reversed.
Hurwitz, Hurwitz & Remer, Robert R. Hurwitz and James
B. MacDonald for Plaintiffs and Appellants.
Jordan, Dodge & Loveridge, Dodge & Loveridge, Paul F.
Loveridge, Henry Hill, Vaverka & Price and Donald R. Price
for Defendants and Respondents.
)

[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Mortgages and Trust Deeds, § 472.
McK. Dig. References: [1,2] Trust Deeds, § 95(2)(a).
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TRAYNOR, C. J.-Plaintiffs appeal from a judgment 'f(
defendants in an action to recover the balance due on
promissory note. The note was secured by a second deed (
trust on real property, but the security had been exhausted 11
a sale under the first deed of trust. The trial court grant€
defendants' motion for summary judgment on the groUD
that the undisputed facts established that Code of Civil Prl
cedure section 580b barred any recovery. [1] We agree wi1
plaintiffs' contention that section 580b does not bar recovel
in this case.
Plaintiffs are real estate brokers who acted for both parti,
in the negotiation of an exchange of an apartment buildir
owned by defendants for two unimproved lots owned by tJ
Agajanian Investment Corporation and Santa Anita Inve~
ments, Inc. The exchange agreement was executed.on June 2
1965. The parties valued the apartment building at $188,~
and the two lots at $350,000. To compensate for ~he differen
in value, defendants executed a note for $144,500 ~ecured by
first deed of trust on one of the lots in favor of Santa Ani
and a second note for $17,500 secured by a second deed
trust on the same lot in favor of plaintiffs. The other lot w
unencumbered.
Each party tt) the exchange agreed to pay plaintiffs a COl
mission of 5 percent of the value of its property. Defendar
paid in cash the commission they owed plaintiffs. In lieu o:f
cash payment of the commission owed by Agajanian 8J
Santa. Anita, plaintiffs accepted defendants'· note for $17,5
secured by the second deed of trust. The amount owed .
defendants to Agajanian and Santa Anita was correspOll
ingly reduced. In effect, defendants borrowed the amount
the $17,500 commission from plaintiffs and used it as part
the purchase price. The facts thus parallel those in Bargi(
v. Hill (1963) 59 Ca1.2d 121 [28 Cal.Rptr. 321, 378 P.
593].
In the Bargioni case we held that when the price
property is reduced by the. amount of the commission 1
seller owes to the broker and the buyer executes a nl
secured by a second deed of trust to the broker for the arnOt
of the commission, the broker is a third-party lender of p'
chase money. Accordingly, we concluded that section 580b
it then read precluded a deficiency judgment in favor of 1
broker after the security }md been exhausted by a sale unc
the first deed of trust. (See also Brown v. Jensen (1953)
Ca1.2d 193, 197-198 [259 P.2d 425].)
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After the Bargioni case was decided, the Legislature
amended section 580b. It now provides: "No deficiency judgment shall lie in any event after any sale of real property for
failure of the purchaser to complete his contract of sale, or
under a deed of trust, or mortgage, given to tlte vendor to
secure payment of the balance of the purchase price of real
property, or under'a deed of trust, or mortgage, on a dwelling

for not more than four families given to a lender to secure
, repayment of a loan which was in fact used to pay all or part
of the purchase price of such dwelling occupied, entirely or in
part, by the purchaser." (Italicized parts added by 1963

·-.....

amendment. )
The amendment limits the protection given vendees against
.Donvendor purchase money lenders to vendees of defined residential property. 'Since the property in this case is unimproved commercial property, section 580b no longer precludes
third-party lenders of purchase money for such property from
obtaining a deficiency judgment.
Defendants contend, however, that even if plaintiffs are Dot
precluded from recovering a deficiency judgment as lenders,
they are also vendors within the meaning of section 580b and
are therefore barred from recovering a deficiency judgment
regardless of the character of the property involved. Defend. ants point out that the Dote and deed of trust plaintiffs
accepted was given to discharge .Agajanian's and Santa
Anita's obligation as \'endors and they conclude that therefore it must be deemed to be a note and deed of trust given to
the vendors. To hold otherwise, they contend, will open the
door to evasion of the protection that section 580b was enacted
to provide.
The answer to this contention is that under the plain
language of the 1963 amendment to section 580b plaintiffs are
,lenders and Dot vendors. [2]· That amendment expressly distinguishes between It'nders of purchase mont'y and vendors and
contemplates that the parties to a saie of real property, other
than the defined residential property, may freely elect to
arrange for the financing of the purchase price in ways that
may wholly or in part limit the vendee's protection from
deficiency judgments. If the parties wish to afford fu]} protection to the vendee, they may provide that all security instruments be given to the vendor, in which case subsequent
assignees from the vendor would take subject to section 580b.
If the vendor is not willing to accept such extensive risks,
however, he may insist that all or part of the purchase price
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be financed by third parties, whose remedies are not affected
by section 580b. Moreover, in such a case it is immaterial
whether the third party who assists in the financing makes a
. payment of part of the price to the vendor' in exchange for the
vendee's note and deed of trust or, as in this case, discharges
an existing obligation of the vendor in exchange' for the
vendee's note and deed of trust. (Bargioni v. Hill, supra, 59
Ca1.2d 121, 123-124.)
The parties could have chosen another method for the payment of plaintiffs' commission that would have afforded
defendants the protection of section 580b. Thus, defendants
could have given the note and deed of trust to Agajanian and
Santa Anita with the understanding that they would in turn
assign them to plaintiffs and guarantee payment. Such a
transaction, however, would have been substantially different
from the one the parties entered into, for it would have
afforded defendants protection against a deficiency judgment
at the risk of Agajanian, Santa Anita, and plaintiffs. It is
reasonable to assume that had defendants bargained for the
protection of section 580b' with respect to plaintiffs' note and
deed of trust, they would have given some quid pro quo.
Since the note and deed of trust for plaintiffs' commission
was given by defendants, not to a vendor but to a iliird-party
lender of purchase money for commercial property, defendants are precluded by the express terms of the 1963 amendment to section 580b from invoking the protection of that
section against a deficiency judgment.
The judgment is reversed.

/)

McComb, J., Peters, J., Tobriner, J., Mosk, J., Burke, J.,
and Sullivan, J., concurred.
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